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I study the welfare cost of business cycles in a complete-markets economy where
some people are more risk averse than others. Relatively more risk-averse people buy
insurance against aggregate risk, and relatively less risk-averse people sell insurance.
These trades reduce the welfare cost of business cycles for everyone. Indeed, the least
risk-averse people benet from business cycles. Moreover, even innitely risk-averse
people suer only nite and, in my empirical estimates, very small welfare losses. In
other words, when there are complete insurance markets, aggregate 
uctuations in
consumption are essentially irrelevant not just for the average person { the surprising
nding of Lucas (1987) { but for everyone in the economy, no matter how risk averse
they are. If business cycles matter, it is because they aect productivity or interact
with uninsured idiosyncratic risk, not because aggregate risk per se reduces welfare.
Keywords: business cycles; risk aversion; risk sharing; heterogeneity.
JEL classi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previously as part of a longer manuscript titled \Heterogeneity, Risk Sharing and the Welfare Costs of Risk."1 Introduction
Ever since Lucas (1987) demonstrated that business cycles have minuscule welfare costs
in a representative-agent model, researchers have tried to nd alternative contexts in which
business cycles do have meaningful welfare costs. One of the most fruitful ideas has been
to consider the possibility that people are heterogeneous and, therefore, that business cycles
have larger welfare costs for some people than for others. This paper studies a competing
and, to my knowledge, previously unexplored phenomenon: Heterogeneity creates more
opportunities for trade, thereby reducing the welfare cost of business cycles for everyone. I
use theory and data to show that when markets are complete and some people are more
risk averse than others, aggregate shocks generate small and bounded welfare costs even for
consumers whose risk aversion approaches innity. Furthermore, the least risk-averse people
can be better o with business cycles than without them, because business cycles create the
opportunity to sell insurance against aggregate risk.
To gain intuition for the results, consider an economy that contains some risk-averse
agents as well as some risk-neutral agents whose consumption is allowed to be negative in
equilibrium. The risk-neutral agents will fully insure the risk-averse agents at a fair price; all
agents are indierent between a world with business cycles and one without. The welfare cost
of business cycles thus is zero for everyone, even if the risk-averse agents are extremely risk
averse and regardless of the numbers of risk-averse and risk-neutral agents in the economy.
Next, and more realistically, suppose the risk-neutral agents' consumption must be non-
negative. Full insurance may now be infeasible if the total endowment of the risk-neutral
agents is suciently small. The risk-neutral agents hence may have to charge a risk premium
so that the risk-averse agents demand a feasible amount of insurance. The risk premium
makes the risk-neutral agents better o with business cycles than without; the risk-averse
agents experience a welfare loss, but it is smaller than they would experience if no insurance
1were available. In this paper, I consider an economy where all agents are risk averse but
some can be arbitrarily close to risk neutral. The intuition from risk-neutral agents whose
consumption must be non-negative carries through to my model because, in the limit as risk
aversion goes to zero, an agent with constant relative risk aversion becomes one who is risk
neutral but faces a non-negativity constraint.
My results oer two cautions for the literature on the welfare cost of business cycles.
First is a non-aggregation result. One cannot calculate the welfare cost in an economy with
heterogeneous preferences by averaging the welfare costs of representative agents with various
levels of risk aversion, because the cost of a representative agent is higher than the cost of an
agent who has the same preferences in an economy with heterogeneity. Second is a caveat
to one of the responses to Lucas' result. Some researchers have argued that Lucas assumed
too small a coecient of relative risk aversion and that business cycles matter more if one
assumes people are very risk averse. One might think, therefore, that some people could
suer greatly from business cycles just because they are very risk averse compared with the
average person. But this is not necessarily true: I show that when markets are complete,
very risk-averse people need not experience large welfare costs, because these people may be
well insured as long as they can trade with others who are less risk averse.
My results also clarify the role of heterogeneity in understanding the costs of aggregate
risk. Heterogeneity has two eects on welfare costs because it comes in two 
avors: hetero-
geneity in experiences and heterogeneity in initial conditions. Heterogeneity in experiences
means that people start out life identical, but they experience dierent uninsured shocks
and, as a result, their consumption paths diverge over time. Heterogeneity in experiences is
intimately tied to market structure. When all shocks are fully insured, heterogeneity van-
ishes, while in general the amount of heterogeneity depends on which shocks are insured
and to what extent. Heterogeneity in initial conditions, by contrast, means that people are
not identical even at the beginning of life; some start with dierent preferences, endow-
2ments or technology than others. In general, these initial dierences translate into persistent
dierences in consumption patterns throughout life, regardless of market structure.
The separate roles of these two kinds of heterogeneity have not been entirely clear in the
literature because in
uential papers on heterogeneous agent models, in particular the work of
Krusell and Smith (1998, 1999), have considered heterogeneity in preferences and experiences
at the same time. I use a model with heterogeneity only in preferences to highlight the
diering eects of the two kinds of heterogeneity. Agents in the model own shares of the
aggregate endowment and trade a complete set of contingent claims. In equilibrium, more
risk-averse agents have smoother consumption and bear less aggregate risk, in return for
lower average consumption. The result that more risk-averse agents bear less aggregate risk
has been known since at least Wilson (1968), but its implications for business cycles appear
not to have been studied previously. My model shows that because heterogeneity in initial
conditions creates the opportunity to reallocate aggregate risk, it reduces welfare costs. The
heterogeneity that can increase welfare costs is heterogeneity in experiences or, put another
way, market incompleteness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and derives a formula for
the welfare gain from eliminating aggregate 
uctuations. Section 3 performs computational
experiments to show how welfare gains depend on an individual's preferences and on the
distribution of preferences in the economy. Section 4 discusses econometric methods for esti-
mating the model using microdata on household consumption. Section 5 presents estimates
of the welfare costs of business cycles, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Lucas (1987) calculated the expected utility of a representative agent who receives a ran-
dom consumption stream and computed the amount of certain consumption that would give
3the agent the same utility. The dierence between this certainty-equivalent consumption
and the mean of the risky consumption stream is the welfare cost of risk. If the random con-
sumption stream is (ltered or detrended) aggregate consumption, the calculation describes
the welfare cost of business cycles.
My goal is simply to show the role of preference heterogeneity in the calculation, so my
model deviates from that of Lucas (1987) in only two ways. First, instead of a representative
agent, there are many agents, and they do not all have the same risk preferences. Second,
Lucas obtained analytic results by assuming a log-normal distribution of aggregate shocks,
but distributional assumptions do not simplify the calculations in my model and so I allow
the shocks to come from any distribution with a nite number of states.1
2.1 Preferences, endowments, markets and equilibrium
When agents have time-separable expected utility preferences, risk aversion is the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and heterogeneous preferences will motivate
agents to make intertemporal consumption trades even in the absence of aggregate risk.
Indeed, with constant relative risk aversion preferences, the least risk-averse agent in a
growing economy will ultimately consume all of the aggregate endowment. To abstract from
these intertemporal issues and focus on risk aversion, while recognizing that I will need time
series data to estimate the model, I consider a sequence of one-period economies indexed
by dates t. Each economy can be in one of several possible states, s = 1;:::;S, each with
probability s. The possible states and their probabilities are the same for all economies.
Before the state of the economy is known, agents in the economy trade contingent claims;
then the state is realized, the claims pay o, and the agents consume. There is one good,
denoted c.
1Assuming a nite number of states allows me to avoid technical concerns about innite-dimensional
commodity spaces and the existence of expectations over states but is not otherwise crucial to the results.
4Each economy contains a continuum of agents. An agent i is characterized by an en-
dowment share wi and a coecient of relative risk tolerance i 2 (0;1) (the inverse of the
coecient of relative risk aversion). An agent with endowment share wi receives a fraction
wi of the aggregate income in each state, and
R
wi dF(wi;i) = 1. This is an endowment
economy; there is no production or (since the economy lasts only one period) investment.





The economy may be larger at some dates t than at other dates, but I assume that
aggregate risk is the same in all economies: Aggregate income in economy t in state s is
gtms, where gt is a non-random sequence. I normalize
PS
s=1 sms = 1, so that the expected
value of aggregate income in economy t is gt. I also assume that the joint distribution of
preferences and endowments F(wi;i) is the same at all dates t.2
Markets are complete. Let spst be the price of a claim to one unit of consumption in


















An equilibrium in economy t is a set of prices fpstg and a consumption allocation fcistg such




cist dF(wi;i) = gtms: (2)
2In a model with agents living multiple periods, one could obtain a stationary joint distribution of
preferences and endowments by having agents die each period with some probability and be replaced by
a draw from some (not necessarily stationary) distribution, but one does not need so much machinery to
obtain the results in this paper.









it) 1=i is the Lagrange multiplier on i's budget constraint in economy t. Substi-








 i dF(wi;i) = ms: (4)















Equations (4) and (5) together determine the Lagrange multipliers A
it and the prices p
st in
economy t. The size of the economy gt does not enter these equations, and nothing else in the
model depends on t. Therefore, neither the prices nor the Lagrange multipliers depend on
t, and we can henceforth write A
i instead of A
it and p
s instead of p
st. It will also be helpful




sms = 1. With this normalization, and with the realization that prices and





i + loggt   i logp
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s; (6)


























  dW() = ms (8)
where dW() =
R
wi dF(wi;i = ) is the total endowment of agents with risk tolerance .
Equation (8) does not have an analytic solution for general joint distributions of risk
tolerance and endowment shares, but we can derive some simple facts about the prices.
First, (8) implies that p
s is strictly decreasing in ms. Second, the normalization on prices
requires either that p
s = 1 for all s or p
s < 1 for some s and p
s0 > 1 for some s0 6= s, since
otherwise the normalizations
PS
s=1 sms = 1 and
PS
s=1 sp
sms = 1 cannot both hold. Third,
because p
s is strictly decreasing in ms, we must then have p
s < 1 for some s and p
s0 > 1
for some s0 6= s in any economy where there is aggregate risk. Fourth, (8) shows that, with
respect to prices, there is aggregation within groups of agents classied by risk tolerance; all
that matters is the total endowment share dW() of agents with each possible value of risk
tolerance, not the division of endowment shares among agents with the same risk tolerance.
To interpret the Lagrange multipliers A
i, rst consider the case where all agents have
identical preferences i =  . Since H(p
1;:::;p
S;i) is then the same constant for all i,
(7) then says that A
i is proportional to wi: When everyone has the same preferences, the
Lagrange multipliers are (up to a normalization) the endowment shares. Now consider
the case where preferences vary. Equation (7) shows that the Lagrange multipliers A
i are
increasing in the endowment shares wi, but the Lagrange multipliers are adjusted away
from the endowment shares by a factor H(p
1;:::;p
S;i) that depends on risk tolerance; the
adjustment implies that agent i's average consumption is adjusted away from i's endowment
share, since according to (6) each agent's consumption is increasing in A
i in every state.
We can see the precise way in which consumption is adjusted away from endowment


























If this ratio is less than 1, the expected value of i's consumption is less than the expected
value of i's endowment, which means i pays a risk premium to receive insurance. If the
ratio is greater than 1, the expected value of i's consumption exceeds the expected value
of i's endowment: i receives a risk premium for providing insurance. The ratio is strictly
increasing in i as long as the prices p
s are not all the same.3 Feasibility requires either that
the ratio be exactly 1 for all agents or that it be greater than 1 for some agents and less than
1 for others. Thus, since the ratio is strictly increasing in i, agents with low i have a ratio
less than 1 and pay a risk premium, while agents with suciently high i have a ratio greater
than 1 and receive a risk premium. The more risk tolerant an agent is, the larger the risk
premium the agent receives. The only cases where no one pays or receives a risk premium
are those where there is no aggregate risk or all the agents have the same preferences.
2.2 Removing aggregate risk
The Lucas experiment removes aggregate risk while leaving the trend of aggregate con-
sumption unchanged. The calculation thus abstracts from dynamic eects on production
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where e E[] and g Cov[] denote an expectation and a covariance under the probability measure qis. The
logarithm is strictly increasing, so the covariance is positive. Further, Q2
i > 0, and the denominator is
positive. Thus the derivative is positive.
8and investment from removing aggregate risk. Dynamic eects may be especially signicant
in an economy with heterogeneous preferences. For example, in related work (Schulhofer-
Wohl, 2007) I show that workers in a risky economy choose jobs in part on the basis of risk
preferences rather than comparative advantage in productivity, so that removing risk could
change the assignment of workers to jobs and make the entire economy more productive.
This could change the growth rate or the level of consumption; either way, there would be
a welfare gain. However, my goal here is to study only the allocational consequences of
heterogeneous risk preferences, so I follow Lucas in assuming that removing risk leaves the
level and trend of consumption unchanged.
Recall that the expected value of consumption in economy t is gt. Suppose agent i in
economy t gives up a fraction k of the expected value but also eliminates all aggregate risk.
Then the agent's endowment will be wi(1   k)gt in every state of the world. There is no
scope for trade in a risk-free one-period economy with one good, so the agent will consume



























To measure i's willingness to pay to remove aggregate risk in economy t, we calculate the
fraction kit that makes ^ Uit(kit) equal to the expected utility in the risky economy U
it. Setting
(10) equal to (11) and solving for kit yields










9The willingness to pay kit depends only on risk tolerance i, not on the size of the economy
gt, the date t or the endowment share wi, so from now on I investigate the willingness to pay
as a function of risk tolerance, which I denote k():










The willingness to pay is decreasing in risk tolerance . The rst reason for this result is
obvious: More risk-tolerant agents suer less disutility from a given amount of variance in
consumption. The second reason is less obvious but is central to the results of this paper: As
shown in (9), the presence of aggregate risk creates the opportunity for more risk-tolerant
agents to sell insurance to less risk-tolerant agents. Indeed, there exists a nite value of risk
tolerance { call it  { such that all agents with risk tolerance  >  have k() < 0 and
experience a welfare gain from aggregate risk, even though they are risk averse.4 Aggregate
risk allows these less risk-averse agents to sell so much insurance that the risk premium they
receive more than osets the disutility from the consumption 
uctuations they experience.
We can also consider agents at the opposite extreme of preferences, those who are ex-
tremely risk averse and have risk tolerance near zero. Consider reducing one agent's risk
tolerance while holding the prices xed:5
lim
!0









This limit provides an upper bound on welfare costs. Even if we do not know the distribution
of risk aversion, the limit tells us the most that anyone in the economy would be willing to
4To prove that k() < 0 for  suciently large, note that when there is aggregate risk, and under the chosen
normalization on prices, mins p




sg] 1 > 1 and
thus lim!1 k() < 0. Because k() is continuous in  and because welfare costs cannot depend on the
normalization of prices, this completes the proof.
5With a continuum of agents, any one agent's preferences do not aect the prices.
10pay to eliminate business cycles.
In addition, we can compare the welfare costs of aggregate risk in an economy with
heterogeneous preferences to the costs we would calculate in an economy where all agents
have the same preferences. Let krep() be the willingness to pay to eliminate aggregate risk
of a representative agent with risk tolerance . Since the expected utility of such an agent




s=1 s(wigtms)1 1==(1   1=), we have
k









We can show that, for essentially all agents, the willingness to pay of a representative agent
with risk tolerance  in an economy containing only agents with the same risk tolerance is
strictly larger than the agent's willingness to pay in an economy where risk preferences vary.
Proposition. Suppose that there is aggregate risk and that not all agents have the same risk
tolerance. Then krep()  k() for all  in the support of F(wi;i), and there is at most one
value of  in the support for which the inequality is not strict.
Proof. See appendix A.
The proposition follows from the fact that the competitive equilibrium is in the core. Since
participants in the heterogeneous-agent economy can do as well as a representative agent if
they remain in autarky, the statement is equivalent to the claim that in the economy with
heterogeneity, all agents but one are strictly better o in the competitive equilibrium than
in autarky. If two agents with dierent risk tolerances were no better o in the equilibrium
than in autarky, they could form a blocking coalition, trade and be better o, contradicting
the fact that the equilibrium is in the core.6
6To see why one agent can be indierent between autarky and equilibrium, consider an economy with





Since the endowment satises the budget constraint, i will consume the endowment if it also satises the
11Consider computing an \average willingness to pay" of all agents in an economy by some
weighted average of the individual agents' willingness to pay. Many weights are possible. For
example, agents could all have equal weight, or the agents' weights could be proportional
to their endowment shares. However, the proposition implies that, regardless of the weights
used, any computation based on the representative agent willingness to pay will overstate
the true welfare cost of business cycles. Specically, let dV () be any weights that are non-
negative for all  in the support of F(wi;i) and strictly positive for at least two values of 




krep()dV (). To put it another way, in an economy
with heterogeneous risk preferences, the average willingness to pay { however the average is
dened { is less than the average of representative agents' willingness to pay.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the welfare cost of business cycles for an innitely
risk-averse representative agent to that for an innitely risk-averse agent in the economy with
heterogeneity. Equation (13) gives the upper bound on welfare costs in the heterogeneous-
agent economy. The bound depends on the probability of each state and resources in that




rep() = 1   min
s ms;
which depends only on resources in the worst state and not on the probability of this state









1)]=[log(m2=m1)] > 0 since p
2 > p
1 if and only if m1 < m2. If the distribution of
risk tolerance is continuous and unbounded, then, regardless of the equilibrium prices, (*) holds for some
i. This i consumes his endowment in equilibrium and is indierent between equilibrium and autarky. An
unbounded or discrete distribution may still contain the i given by (*). With S > 2 states, (*) becomes a
system of S 1 > 1 nonlinear equations in one unknown, i. Such a system generically has no solution, but I
have not found a proof that no distribution of states, endowments and preferences can generate equilibrium
prices for which the system does have a solution.
12probability thus completely determine the innitely risk-averse representative agent's cost,
but not so when we introduce heterogeneity.
3 Numerical examples
In this section, I numerically compute the welfare costs of aggregate risk in some simple
but quantitatively reasonable example economies. The computations may help to provide
intuition for the theoretical results. The computations also show that plausible parameter
values can generate quantitatively important departures from representative agent welfare
costs, including cases where some agents benet from aggregate risk.
To simplify the calculations, all of the economies I consider have two equally probable
states of nature, with aggregate resources m1 = 0:98 and m2 = 1:02. These values correspond
to a 2% standard deviation of aggregate shocks, which is similar to the behavior of detrended
postwar U.S. GDP. All of the economies have two agents. One agent always has log utility. I
experiment with varying the other agent's risk preferences and the endowment share of each
agent. The economies can equivalently be interpreted as containing two types of agent, with
the endowment shares representing the total endowment of each type.
3.1 An unconstrained risk-neutral agent
Suppose that one agent is risk neutral and that there are no non-negativity constraints
on consumption. Let w1 be the endowment share of the risk-averse agent, who has log utility.
In the competitive equilibrium, the risk-averse agent must be fully insured at a fair price
and consumes w1 in each state. Meanwhile, the risk-neutral agent consumes ms w1 in each
state. Both agents are indierent between this economy and one without business cycles,
regardless of the endowment shares. Further, the risk-averse agent is strictly better o in
this economy than he would be in a representative-agent economy where all agents had log
13utility, while the risk-neutral agent is indierent between his outcome in this economy and
his outcome as a representative agent.
3.2 A risk-neutral agent with non-negativity constraints
The case with unconstrained risk-neutral agents is not directly comparable to the case
where all agents are strictly risk averse because, when all agents are strictly risk averse
with CRRA preferences, an Inada condition will force all agents' consumption to be strictly
positive. For comparability, I examine the case where one agent is risk neutral but each
agent's consumption is constrained to be non-negative.7
In this case, the risk-averse agent remains fully insured at a fair price if his endowment
share w1 does not exceed 0.98. However, full insurance at a fair price (i.e., c1s = w1 for
all s) is infeasible if w1 > 0:98. I have solved the agents' rst-order conditions and budget













[w1;0:98   w1;w1;1:02   w1] w1  0:98;
[0:98;0;1:02w1=(2   w1);1:02(2   2w1)=(2   w1)] w1 > 0:98:
7To justify the comparison formally, we can show that in the limit as risk tolerance goes to innity, CRRA
preferences become the preferences of a risk-neutral agent facing a non-negativity constraint. Observe that
u(c;) = c1 1==(1   1=) is not dened for c < 0. However, since the Inada condition guarantees the agent
will choose c > 0, dening u(c;) =  1 for c < 0 will not change the agent's choices. That is, CRRA





1 1= c  0
 1 c < 0:





c c  0
 1 c < 0;
which is the utility function of a risk-neutral agent whose consumption is constrained to be non-negative.











1   w1 w1  0:98;
(1   w1) 1:02
2 w1 w1 > 0:98:
In a risk-free economy, the risk-neutral agent's expected utility would be 1   w1. Since
1:02=(2   w1) > 1 for all w1 > 0:98, the risk-neutral agent is better o in the risky economy
than the risk-free economy whenever w1 > 0:98. The intuition is that when full insurance
is infeasible, the risk-neutral agent collects a positive risk premium to reduce the risk-averse
agent's demand for insurance. The risk premium makes the risk-neutral agent better o
than if there were no risk and no scope for insurance.
Figure 1 plots each agent's willingness to pay to remove aggregate risk as a function of
the risk-averse agent's endowment share w1. When w1  0:98, there is full insurance and
both agents are indierent between the risky and risk-free economies. For w1 > 0:98, the
risk-averse agent is willing to pay to remove risk, while the risk-neutral agent is better o
with risk. As the risk-averse agent's endowment share approaches 1, his willingness to pay
approaches 0.02%, which is what he would be willing to pay if he were a representative agent.
Figure 2 illustrates the sense in which the limit as risk tolerance goes to innity is a
risk-neutral agent subject to non-negativity constraints. The gure plots the welfare costs of
aggregate risk for each agent when 2 = 50, when 2 = 200, when 2 = 500 and when agent
2 is risk neutral but faces a non-negativity constraint. The curves for 2 = 50, 2 = 200 and
2 = 500 converge to the curve for the risk-neutral constrained case.
3.3 Two risk-averse agents, varying endowment shares
Suppose that agent 1 has risk tolerance 1 = 0:25, corresponding to a coecient of relative
risk aversion of 4, while agent 2 has log utility (2 = 1). Since agent 1 is more risk averse,
15agent 2 will insure agent 1 against aggregate risk. This creates the possibility that, for some
parameters, agent 2 collects a suciently large risk premium to benet from aggregate risk.
I have numerically solved the agents' rst-order conditions and budget constraints to nd
the competitive equilibrium prices and allocation for varying levels of agent 1's endowment
share. Figure 3 plots each agent's corresponding willingness to pay to remove aggregate risk.
As agent 1's endowment share rises, his willingness to pay also rises, because agent 2 has
less resources and can provide less insurance. Increases in agent 1's endowment share reduce
agent 2's willingness to pay, because when agent 2 has a small endowment share, he can
collect a large risk premium from agent 1. Indeed, when agent 1's endowment share is larger
than about 0.66, agent 2 has a negative willingness to pay. That is, in an economy where
less than one-third of the people have log utility and more than two-thirds have a coecient
of relative risk aversion of 4, and where aggregate shocks have a standard deviation of 2%,
the agents with log utility benet from business cycles.
3.4 Two risk-averse agents, varying preferences
Finally, I consider holding the agents' endowment shares xed and varying one agent's
preferences. Agent 2 has log utility and an endowment share of 0.333. Agent 1 has an
endowment share of 0.667; I vary agent 1's risk tolerance and then compute the competitive
equilibrium allocation and each agent's willingness to pay.
Figure 4 plots the results. Agent 1 is always willing to pay to remove aggregate risk,
and his willingness to pay rises with his risk aversion. However, it rises less rapidly than the
willingness to pay that we would compute by treating him as a representative agent.
Agent 2's willingness to pay has an inverted U shape. When agent 1 has log utility,
agent 2's willingness to pay in the competitive equilibrium exactly matches the representa-
tive agent calculation because both agents have the same preferences and there is, in fact, a
representative agent. Otherwise, agent 2's willingness to pay is less than the representative
16agent calculation would suggest. When agent 1 has very low risk aversion, agent 2's willing-
ness to pay is low because he can obtain insurance from agent 1. As agent 1's risk aversion
rises, agent 2's willingness to pay also rises because the agents are becoming more alike and
the opportunities for insurance are reduced. Once agent 1 becomes more risk averse than
agent 2, further increases in agent 1's risk aversion decrease agent 2's willingness to pay,
because agent 2 can now sell insurance to agent 1 and collect a risk premium. If agent 1 has
a coecient of relative risk aversion greater than about 4, agent 2 benets from cycles.
4 Empirical analysis: data and econometric methods
Equation (12) expresses the willingness to pay to eliminate aggregate risk as a function of
risk tolerance , prices p
s, aggregate shocks ms, and probabilities s. (Aggregate shocks do




that the equation assumes.) Thus, for a real economy, we can calculate the willingness to
pay for any given value of  if we know the aggregate shocks, the prices and the probabilities.
(My goal will be to estimate the willingness to pay as a function of , not to estimate any
individual agent's risk tolerance, the distribution of risk tolerance in the population or the
average willingness to pay of all agents. Nonetheless, given estimates of the function k(),
a reader who has in mind a distribution of  can integrate k() against that distribution to
nd the average willingness to pay.)
The probabilities are straightforward to handle: Since the model is stationary, averages
over possible states in one economy are the same as averages over time in a sequence of
economies where dierent states are realized. Suppose we collect data on a sequence of dates
indexed by  = 1;:::;T. Let m be the realized value of the aggregate shock at , and let
p
 be the price corresponding to the state realized at . Then, if we observed the aggregate
shocks and prices, we could normalize the prices to satisfy T 1 PT
=1 p
m = 1 and then
17replace the sums over states in (12) by sums over time and estimate the willingness to pay
of an agent with risk tolerance  by












In the limit as T goes to innity, ~ k(;T) would converge in probability to k() by a law of
large numbers.
In principle, we could measure the aggregate shocks m from the National Income and
Product Accounts. The prices are more dicult. Although it might seem natural to obtain
prices from nancial market data, we cannot do so because the prices in question are those
of a non-traded asset: a one-period-ahead claim to a share of the aggregate endowment in
various states.8 Thus we must turn elsewhere. My strategy is to exploit the relationship be-
tween prices and individual consumption to recover the prices from cross-sectional consump-
tion data. For consistency, I then estimate aggregate shocks from the same cross-sectional
data. Estimating the aggregate shocks from NIPA would run the risk of inconsistency with
the estimated prices from cross-sectional data, especially since the aggregate data (which
are derived from surveys of rms) and microdata (from surveys of consumers) have been
diverging over time for reasons that remain unclear (Garner et al., 2006). Below, when I
report my results, I check whether my estimates of aggregate consumption from microdata
are in line with NIPA data. The rest of this section concerns how to estimate prices and
aggregate shocks from cross-sectional data and how to use the estimated prices and shocks
to compute the willingness to pay as a function of .
8Methods are known for bounding the expected return on non-traded assets using no-arbitrage conditions
(e.g., Alvarez and Jermann, 2004), but the expected return is not sucient for calculating k(): We need
to know the actual price for a claim on each separate state so that we can calculate the expectation of a
nonlinear function of the prices. Alvarez and Jermann (2004) also estimate prices date-by-date under the
assumption of common preferences, but this assumption would be inappropriate in the present context.
184.1 Data
I analyze data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey. Implicit in the results,
therefore, will be the assumption that a complete markets allocation reasonably approximates
the U.S. economy. Although this assumption is undoubtedly controversial, a growing body
of evidence (e.g., Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007; ?) suggests that insurance in the U.S. economy is
quite good. U.S. households also make substantial transactions that insure more risk-averse
people against aggregate risk. More risk-averse investors put more money in bonds and
less in stocks (Barsky et al., 1997), and we can interpret the risk premium on stocks as an
insurance premium that bondholders pay to avoid aggregate risk.
The Consumer Expenditure Survey is a rotating panel with four quarterly observations
per household. Dierent households begin the survey in dierent months of a quarter, so
although consumption is measured at a quarterly frequency, I can construct data on aggregate

uctuations at a monthly frequency. I use data on consumption of nondurable goods and
services from 1982 to 2002. As these data are well known, I do not dwell on them here.
Table 1 gives summary statistics, and appendix B describes the sample selection in detail.
4.2 Notation and assumptions
I assume that we observe a random sample of agents at each date . Let  E[] denote
the population mean of a random variable  in the cross-section of agents at date , and let
^ E[] denote the sample mean in the cross-section of observed agents.
I assume that agents' consumption is measured with error: We observe
~ ci = c

iei; (15)
where ei is a strictly positive random variable that is independent of c
i, i.i.d. over individ-
19uals i at each date , independent over dates , and satises
 E[ei] = exp(
0 + 
1); (16a)
 E[logei] = 0 + 1; (16b)
for some unknown constants 
0;
1;0;1. This formulation allows the mean and variance of
measurement error to change over time, in case data quality changes over time. Measurement
error can also have a stationary distribution if 
1 = 1 = 0.
Finally, I assume that the economy grows exponentially and, since I will analyze monthly
data, that it experiences predictable monthly 
uctuations:
g = exp(0 + 1 + 
0x); (17)
where x is a vector of indicator variables for months. My results are potentially sensitive
to this assumption because I will measure the variability of aggregate shocks by examining
deviations of aggregate consumption from the exponential trend and monthly seasonals. If
the overall growth path is not exponential, or if seasonal eects are not the same in all years,
then the assumption in (17) will fail and I will mismeasure the economy's aggregate risk.
4.3 Aggregate shocks
According to (15) and (16a), for any  we have







where I have let N denote the measure of agents in the economy and used the fact that N
times average consumption equals total consumption, which is gm. Substituting (17) into
20(18) and rearranging gives
log( E[~ ci]) = 0 + 
0   logN + (1 + 
1) + 
0x + logm: (19)
Equation (19) shows that the aggregate shock logm is the error term in a time-series
regression of the logarithm of mean consumption [log( E[~ ci])] on an intercept, a time trend
and month dummies. The population mean of consumption is not known, but we can
estimate it by a sample average. I therefore let \ logm be the residual from a regression of
the log of the sample average of consumption [log(^ E[~ ci])] on an intercept, trend and month
dummies. I then estimate the aggregate shock m by ^ m = exp(\ logm). The law of large
numbers implies that ^ m converges in probability to m for each  in the limit as the number
of individuals sampled at each date and the number of dates T both go to innity. To see
this, notice that 1) the regression residuals converge to the regression errors as T goes to
innity, and 2) the sample average of consumption converges to the population average of
consumption as the number of individuals sampled goes to innity.
It is worth noting that, in principle, we need not estimate (19) with cross-sectional data.
We could instead obtain  E[~ ci] from per capita consumption in aggregate data, and then
run the same time-series regression to obtain \ logm. The only reason to estimate (19) with
microdata is for consistency with the estimates of prices, which I discuss next.
4.4 Prices
According to (6), (15), (16b) and (17), for any  we have
 E[log ~ ci] =  E[logA

i] + 0 + 0 + (1 + 1) + 
0x    logp

; (20)
21where   =  E[i] denotes the population mean risk tolerance, which the model assumes is
constant over time. Equation (20) shows that the price logp
 is the error term in a regression
of the population mean of log consumption on an intercept, a time trend and month dummies.
Again, the population mean is not known, but we can estimate it by the sample average of
log consumption. For a given value of  , I let \ logp
( ) be ( 1= ) times the residual from a
regression of the sample average of log consumption, ^ E[log ~ ci], on an intercept, trend and
month dummies. I then estimate the price p
 for this value of   by ^ p
( ) = exp[ \ logp
( )].
The estimated prices will not automatically satisfy the normalization
PS
s=1 sp
sms = 1; I
impose it by scaling prices such that T 1 PT
=1 ^ p
( )^ m = 1. As with the aggregate shocks,
^ p
 converges in probability to p
 as the number of individuals and dates both go to innity.
The foregoing analysis identies prices up to a factor of  , the population average risk
tolerance. We cannot determine the average risk tolerance from consumption data alone,
since multiplying all agents' risk tolerance by the same constant would not change the set
of Pareto-optimal consumption allocations and, unless we know the initial endowments, we
cannot learn anything from observing which competitive equilibrium arises from among all
the Pareto optima.9 Therefore, in section 5 I report estimates of welfare costs for several
9Formally, for any x > 0, if we replace i by xi for all i; p
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for all i, the equation governing the consumption allocation (6) still holds and (since the consumption
allocation has not changed) the aggregate resource constraint is still satised. Further,
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where the next-to-last equality follows from (8). Since ~ wi > 0 and
R
~ wi dF(wi;i) = 1, we can interpret ~ wi
22possible values of  .
4.5 Accounting for random sampling
Given estimates of aggregate shocks and prices, we can estimate the welfare cost of
business cycles for an agent with risk tolerance , as a function of  and of the population
mean risk tolerance  , by












where the prices are normalized such that T 1 PT
=1 ^ p
( )^ m = 1. Since ^ p
 and ^ m converge
in probability to p
 and m, and since ^ k is a continuous function of ^ p
 and ^ m, we have that
^ k(;  ;T) converges in probability to k(;  ) in the limit as the number of individuals and
dates sampled both go to innity.
Despite this consistency result, the nite-sample behavior of ^ k is important. The esti-
mated aggregate shocks ^ m and estimated prices ^ p
 will vary across dates  in the data both
because the economy experienced shocks and because dierent random samples of agents




 +, where  is an estimation error, and similarly for ^ m. The estimated
shocks and estimated prices will therefore be more variable than the true shocks and the
true prices. This added variance will make the economy appear more risky than it truly is,
and a riskier economy will appear to have larger welfare costs of risk. In consequence, the
estimator ^ k will be biased away from zero relative to the true welfare costs.
The structure of the survey creates a second possible source of bias. The use of over-
as an endowment share. Thus if the allocation fc
istg is a competitive equilibrium in an economy with prices
p
s, preferences i and endowment shares wi, the same allocation is also an equilibrium in an economy with
prices ~ p
s, preferences xi and endowment shares ~ wi. We have now described two economies with identical
consumption allocations but dierent mean risk tolerance,   vs. x ; we cannot distinguish between them on
the basis of consumption data alone.
23lapping quarters of data to create a monthly time series implies that the observed monthly
shocks will be a moving average of the true monthly shocks and, therefore, less variable than
the true shocks. This reduced variance could bias my estimated welfare costs toward zero.
The total bias in my estimates from these two sources of bias could be positive or neg-
ative. I correct for the bias using the bootstrap. Let ^ k be the estimated willingness to pay
calculated from (21) for some  and   using the original data. Let k1;:::;kQ be estimates of
the willingness to pay calculated using Q dierent samples, of the same size as the original
sample, drawn from the original data with replacement.10 Horowitz (2001) considers boot-
strap bias correction for estimators that are smooth functions of sample moments, a class
that includes the estimator ^ k considered here. He shows that an estimate of the bias of ^ k
is the dierence between the average of the bootstrap estimates and the original estimate,
^ B =
PQ
j=1 kj=Q   ^ k, and that a bias-corrected estimate of k is ^ k = ^ k   ^ B. According to
equations 3.4 and 3.6 of Horowitz (2001), the correction removes bias up to order O(N 1),
where N is the sample size; higher-order bias can remain.
5 Empirical analysis: results
Figure 5 shows the time series of estimated prices and aggregate shocks. There is substan-
tially uncertainty in the point estimates of the price and aggregate shock at each date. The
uncertainty emphasizes the importance of accounting for sampling error in the calculations:
Since much of the variability in the estimated aggregate shocks and prices is due to sampling
error rather than true aggregate risk, we are at risk of overestimating the amount of aggre-
gate risk and thus overestimating the welfare costs of risk. The bias correction discussed
above is designed precisely to x this problem. It allows us to obtain accurate estimates of
10In the data I employ, each household is observed at multiple dates. I therefore construct the bootstrap
samples by resampling households and then, to account for serial correlation in aggregate shocks, resampling
18-month blocks of estimated prices and aggregate shocks.
24welfare costs despite the noisy estimates of shocks and prices, in essence by estimating how
much of the volatility in the estimated prices and shocks comes from sampling error rather
than true risk.
Despite the sampling error, the estimated prices and aggregate shocks are consistent
with what we expect from the model and from macroeconomic data. First, the prices and
aggregate shocks are strongly negatively related, with a correlation coecient of  0:94,
matching the prediction that prices are decreasing in aggregate resources.11 Second, the
aggregate shocks estimated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey match up well to the
National Income and Product Accounts. The fourth panel of gure 5 shows the estimated
aggregate shocks as well as detrended, seasonally adjusted quarterly per capita real personal
consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services. The NIPA series looks like
a smoothed version of the CEX series, which is unsurprising since the CEX series contains
sampling error. The correlation between the two series { using only every third observation
from the CEX, since the NIPA data are quarterly rather than monthly { is 0.52. The
correlation between the NIPA series and a three-month moving average of the CEX series is
0.61.
Figure 6 graphs the estimated willingness to pay to eliminate aggregate 
uctuations as a
function of the individual risk tolerance , for economies with dierent values of the average
risk tolerance  . (Given the distribution of risk tolerance, which I cannot estimate from
the consumption data, one could convert these graphs into a distribution of the welfare
costs of aggregate risk.) The willingness to pay is small. If the average person has a risk
tolerance of 0.25, equivalent to a coecient of relative risk aversion of 4, then the willingness
to pay is less than three-tenths of a percent of consumption for even the most risk-averse
11My estimation technique does not mechanically produce a negative relationship between prices and
aggregate resources since prices are estimated from the mean of log consumption and aggregate shocks from
the mean of the level of consumption. The cross-sectional mean of the log and the cross-sectional mean of
the level can move in opposite directions if the variance increases when the level increases.
25people, and anyone with a coecient of relative risk aversion less than about 2 benets
from business cycles. If the average person has a risk tolerance of 1, or log utility, then
the willingness to pay is less than one-tenth of a percent of consumption even for the most
risk-averse person, and anyone with a coecient of relative risk aversion less than about 0.5
has a welfare gain. Figure 6 also shows the willingness to pay of a representative agent with
various levels of risk tolerance. As the theoretical analysis showed, a representative agent is
always willing to pay more than an agent with the same risk tolerance in an economy where
risk preferences vary. The representative agent's willingness to pay also diverges sharply as
risk tolerance approaches zero, in contrast to the willingness to pay of agents in an economy
where preferences vary. Figure 7 focuses on the areas in gure 6 where the representative
agent's cost and the cost in a heterogeneous-agent economy are close; although the curves
approach each other, the representative agent's cost remains strictly higher.
Table 2 lists the estimated willingness to pay of an innitely risk averse household, as
a function of the average risk aversion. These calculations show that even making people
extremely risk averse does not produce enormous welfare costs from business cycles. Consider
an economy where the average person has risk tolerance of 0.1, corresponding to a coecient
of relative risk aversion of 10. Then take an innitely risk-averse household in this already
quite risk-averse economy. The innitely risk-averse household would be willing to pay less
than three-quarters of a percent of consumption to eliminate aggregate risk.
The results are, of course, conditional on the aggregate shocks observed in my data. If
the 1982-2002 period is not representative of the true aggregate risk facing the U.S. economy,
for example due to the possibility of rarely observed disasters as in Barro (2007), my results
could underestimate the true welfare cost of business cycles. However, even if the 1982-2002
period does not provide a representative sample of the distribution of aggregate shocks,
the theoretical analysis shows that the central result of this paper { allowing heterogeneous
preferences reduces welfare costs { would obtain under any trend-stationary i.i.d. distribution
26of aggregate shocks, even a much riskier one. An aggregate shock process with rare disasters
could raise the overall level of welfare costs but would not change the eect of heterogeneity.
A separate issue is whether aggregate income is i.i.d. and trend stationary. If aggre-
gate income were a random walk, my estimates would be incorrect because the time series
averages I use to compute welfare costs would not converge to the true costs. If aggregate in-
come were trend stationary but not i.i.d., my results would understate the true welfare costs
because persistent shocks with a small variance can have large eects on lifetime consump-
tion. One of the objections to the results of Lucas (1987) has indeed been that persistent
shocks would generate larger welfare costs (Obstfeld, 1994). To estimate welfare costs in
a world with persistent shocks, however, we would need to nd the competitive equilib-
rium in a dynamic model with agents who live more than one period. Such an equilibrium
would be dicult to compute. Suppose agents live more than one period but die with
some probability, leaving their assets to ospring who may have dierent preferences. Such
a model has a non-degenerate long-run joint distribution of preferences and wealth, since
new agents can be born with any combination of wealth and risk aversion. But the joint
distribution of wealth and preferences may be non-stationary, since shocks will change the
distribution of assets, leading to dierences in the distribution of bequests depending on the
history of shocks. If the joint distribution of wealth and assets is non-stationary, prices may
also be non-stationary. However, the Krusell and Smith (1998) approximation method for
non-stationary prices would be dicult to implement because we would need to keep track
of prices for many dierent contingent claims, rather than a single risk-free rate. Further,
arguably we should consider non-time-separable preferences to separate the roles of risk aver-
sion and intertemporal substitution. Due to these technical challenges, I leave the analysis
of a dynamic model for future research. Still, two points are worth noting:
 The results in this paper hinge on gains from trade that are present regardless of the
distribution of shocks.
27 The main reason to consider a dynamic model is that small persistent shocks have a
large lifetime impact; in this sense, persistent shocks are similar to transitory shocks
with a large variance.
Thus, while the small estimated variance of shocks in my data leads to small welfare costs,
a larger variance would not change the results that heterogeneity in risk aversion generates
gains from trade and reduces welfare costs. A reader who is concerned about the persistence
of shocks may wish to conclude that the magnitude of welfare eects I estimate is too small,
but the qualitative results should not be at issue.
6 Conclusion
One might think that, even if the average person does not suer much from business
cycles, a very risk-averse person could suer greatly. My results show that this is not
necessarily the case. In a complete-markets endowment economy where some people are
very risk averse and others are not, the very risk-averse agents will buy insurance from
less risk-averse agents and will not experience substantial consumption 
uctuations; welfare
losses are reduced for everyone. In other words, we cannot undo Lucas' (1987) result simply
by appealing to the possibility that some people strongly dislike risk.
Business cycles may have welfare consequences for many reasons other than the variability
of aggregate consumption per se. Aggregate shocks may increase the welfare losses associated
with uninsured idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1999). Alternatively, reducing
aggregate risk might increase aggregate income, for example because rms would not make
ex post inecient investments (Ramey and Ramey, 1991), because government policies could
raise output in recessions without lowering it in booms (DeLong and Summers, 1988), or
because removing 
uctuations would raise the economy's growth rate (Barlevy, 2004). The
point of this paper is simply that if business cycles matter, it is primarily for these other
28reasons { not because anyone, even a hypothetical innitely risk-averse person, suers much
disutility directly from 
uctuations in the aggregate endowment.
It would be valuable for future work to investigate empirically the extent to which people
with dierent preferences actually share aggregate risk, and the mechanisms they use to
do so. The central implication of the model in this paper is that more risk-averse people's
consumption moves less with aggregate shocks. Some evidence already exists on this issue.
As noted earlier, Barsky et al. (1997) show that people who express greater risk aversion in
a survey also report holding more bonds and fewer stocks; thus, their asset income is less
correlated with aggregate shocks. Since nancial markets do not oer pure state-contingent
claims on the aggregate resources of the economy, people who share aggregate risk potentially
use mechanisms other than nancial markets to do so. Human capital is one possibility:
In related work (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007), I show that more risk-averse people have labor
income that is less correlated with aggregate shocks. However, it is not known whether
consumption responds to asset and labor income in a way that makes more risk-averse
people's consumption move less with aggregate shocks.
Besides the implication about the relationship between consumption and preferences, the
model in this paper can generate other implications given sucient assumptions about mar-
ket structure. For example, suppose that people trade a complete set of one-period Arrow
securities and that they report as assets the market value of the Arrow-security portfolios.
When there is a bad shock, relatively less risk-averse people consume less than their en-
dowment, while relatively more risk-averse people consume more than their endowment. If
someone consumes less than his endowment, he must save the rest; his assets increase. Hence,
when there is a bad shock, the value of relatively less risk-averse people's portfolios should
rise relative to the value of relatively more risk-averse people's portfolios. The opposite is
true when there is a good shock. One could test this implication by combining panel data
on people's portfolios and preferences with data on aggregate shocks.
29A Proof of proposition
Since agents in the heterogeneous-agent economy can attain the utility (and hence the
welfare cost) of the representative agent if they remain in autarky, it suces to show that:
1. U
t ()  U
rep




utility in the heterogeneous-agent competitive equilibrium and in the representative-
agent economy at t, respectively, and both utilities are normalized by w
1 1=i
i .
2. The inequality U
t ()  U
rep
t () is weak for at most one  in the support.
Agents in the heterogeneous-agent economy attain utility U
rep
t if they remain in autarky.
Since all agents must weakly prefer the competitive equilibrium to autarky, we thus have
U
t ()  U
rep
t () for all  in the support of F(wi;i).We will show by contradiction that the
inequality is weak for at most one  in the support. Suppose to the contrary that there
are two agents i and j, i 6= j, such that the inequality is weak for both agents. The
competitive equilibrium is in the core; therefore, i and j cannot do better than U
t by leaving
the competitive equilibrium and trading with each other. Since i and j can attain U
rep
t by
consuming their endowments, and since by hypothesis U
rep
t = U
t for both i and j, it must
be that i and j cannot improve on their endowments by trading with each other. However,





j(wjgtms0) when risk tolerances
dier and ms 6= ms0. Hence i and j can do better by trading, a contradiction.
B Consumer Expenditure Survey sample selection
I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1982 to 2002. As is common in work with this
dataset, I drop all of the following due to concerns about data quality: incomplete income
responders, non-urban households, individuals in student housing, households where the age
30of the reference person or spouse changes by other than zero or one year between interviews,
and all 1980 and 1981 data. I also drop households where the reference person or spouse
is younger than 21 or older than 85 and where the marital status of the reference person
changes during the survey period. I drop six observations where the reported consumption
data do not span a three-month period and 18 observations that were not separated by
three months from either the previous or subsequent observation. I then drop all households
with fewer than four quarters of data. This leaves 124,348 observations on 31,087 households.
Because changes in the survey prevent matching households across 1985-1986 and 1995-1996,
I have two months without data: December 1985 and December 1995. In addition, there
are relatively few observations on October and November 1985 and October and November
1995. From 92 to 733 households contribute to my estimates for each month.
I use data on nondurable goods and services. I will provide a list of the consumption
categories I include upon request. I sum all expenditures by a household in a given month,
de
ate by the nondurable goods GDP de
ator for that month, then sum the three months
covered by an interview to create a quarterly consumption observation for the household.
I divide consumption by eective household size, dened as 1 for a one-person household,
2 for a two-person household, and 0.4 additional units for each person after the second. I
weight all results by the survey weights.
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32Table 1: Summary statistics for Consumer Expenditure Survey con-
sumption data, 1982-2002.
Variable mean s.d.
quarterly consumptiona 4716 2991
log(quarterly consumption)a 8.28 0.60
adjusted per capita consumptiona,b 2431 1415











Data are on nondurable goods and services consumption. See ap-
pendix B for sample restrictions. Observations are one quarter's
consumption for one household. Households can enter the survey
in any month, so there are observations for 12 dierent quarterly
consumption periods each year. aDe
ated by GDP de
ator for per-
sonal consumption expenditures on nondurable goods; 2000 dollars.
bAdjusted per capita consumption is total consumption divided by
eective household size, dened as 1 for a one-person household, 2
for a two-person household, and 0.4 additional units for each person
after the second.
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